States use judicial conduct commissions to discipline judges who misbehave, but there is a large disparity among commissions in the number of disciplinary actions they take. What makes some commissions more prone to mete out discipline than others? This Note uses a case study of California's Commission on Judicial Performance to tease out several theories: (1) commissions that are controlled by laypeople issue more disciplinary actions than commissions controlled by judges and lawyers; (2) commissions in states that elect their judges issue more disciplinary actions than commissions in states that appoint them; and (3) well-funded commissions issue more disciplinary actions than less well funded commissions. The Note then uses a decade of disciplinary data from thirty-five states to test these three hypotheses. In the end, it finds statistical support for only one hypothesis: the number of disciplinary actions a state commission takes is strongly correlated with the size of the commission's budget.