This Article identifies this phenomenon, which I call “inter-regime doctrinal collapse,” and exposes the individual and institutional consequences. Through analysis of pending litigation, discovery disputes, and licensing agreements, this Article highlights two dominant exploitation tactics enabled by collapse: Companies “buy” data through business-to-business deals that sidestep individual privacy interests or “ask” users for broad consent through privacy policies and terms of service that leverage notice and choice frameworks. Left unchecked, the data acquisition status quo favors established corporate players and impedes the law’s ability to constrain the arbitrary exercise of private power.

Doctrinal collapse poses a fundamental challenge to the rule of law. When a leading AI developer can simultaneously argue that data is public enough to scrape—diffusing privacy and copyright controversies—and private enough to keep secret—avoiding disclosure or oversight of its training data—something has gone seriously awry with how law constrains power. To manage these costs and preserve space for salutary innovation, we need a law of collapse. This Article offers institutional responses, drawn from conflict of laws and legal pluralism, to create one.

* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University. Thank you to BJ Ard, Elettra Bietti, Bob Brauneis, Danielle Keats Citron, Julie Cohen, David Freeman Engstrom, Kat Geddes, Jake Goldenfein, Aziz Huq, Amanda Levendowski, Martha Minow, Chris Morten, Paul Ohm, Richard Re, Barak Richman, Jon Siegel, Jessica Silbey, Ben Sobel, Dan Solove, Xiyin Tang, Salomé Viljoen, Ari Ezra Waldman, Daniel Wilf-Townsend, participants at the 75th Annual ICA Conference Panel, Code Is Not Law: Reassembling the Social in Technology Law and the 2025 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and attendees of the George Washington University Law School faculty workshop for invaluable comments, conversations, and support. Thank you to Rachel Layne and Rhyia Bibby for outstanding research assistance. I also wish to thank the editors of the Stanford Law Review, especially Boyce Buchanan and Emily Harrington, for comments and questions that helped me to refine and sharpen the argument. This paper was awarded an honorable mention in the 2026 AALS Scholarly Papers Competition and recognized as one of six winners of the Future of Privacy Forum’s 2026 Privacy Papers for Policymakers Award. The Article was substantively finalized in December 2025 and reflects updates through that point in time. All remaining errors and omissions are my own.