Much attention in the antitrust world has been focused on efforts by brand drug manufacturers to delay or deter generic entry into the pharmaceutical markets following these brand drugs’ loss of patent exclusivity. Scholars have recounted and criticized recent exclusionary techniques by brand drug manufacturers, including pay-for-delay (or reverse-payment settlement) agreements, noncash pay-for-delay agreements, and product hopping. These efforts, while successful in stymieing generic entry into the prescription drug market, have largely been struck down by courts as anticompetitive in a series of recent decisions. In light of these decisions, a key, but underanalyzed, concern now is that in order to keep generics out of the market, or at least delay their entry, brand manufacturers will turn to a new tactic: predatory pricing using authorized generics. While some scholarly attention was paid to authorized generics in the early 2000s, almost none has been given since the Supreme Court held unlawful brand drug manufacturers’ other main exclusionary tactics, despite the fact that the time is now ripe for the launch of authorized generics. Given that courts have already permitted a brand manufacturer’s launch of an authorized generic during a first-filer generic’s exclusivity period, brand manufacturers could deter generic entry by launching an authorized generic upon the start of the first filer’s exclusivity period but pricing the authorized generic below the generic’s costs, thereby preventing the generic from recouping its substantial entry costs. Eventually, if generics see a pattern of brands launching authorized generics during the first filer’s period of exclusivity, generics may be deterred from entering the market at all before patent expiration, thereby depriving consumers of price competition in the pharmaceutical market, resulting in higher drug prices overall.