The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial represents one of the most fundamental safeguards for criminal defendants secured by our Constitution. Notwithstanding its significance, the full scope of the right’s application remains uncertain, as lower courts have split on whether the right applies to sentencing proceedings. After the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the right did apply in Pollard v. United States, federal and state courts have taken various approaches to answering this basic question. Despite these conflicts, almost no scholarship has touched on the application of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right to sentencing. This Note aims to fill that gap with a comprehensive analysis of the circuit split, as well as a reasoned and novel argument for application of the speedy trial right to sentencing. Part I provides a backdrop of the right’s historical development and its treatment in recent decades by the Supreme Court. Part II analyzes the circuit split in depth, presenting a detailed overview of each side’s reasoning and conclusions. Part III assesses historical, textual, doctrinal, and policy-based justifications for a speedy sentencing right to conclude that the right should apply through sentencing. However, the remedy for speedy trial right violations—automatic dismissal of charges—should be adapted logically for the sentencing context, resulting in dismissal of all but the minimum sentence to which the defendant is exposed.