Multimember commissions are a central feature of the modern administrative state. Yet a growing number have lost their legal authority to function—not through statutory repeal or defunding, but because they lack a quorum. In many cases, these quorum losses stem from the President’s assertion of a broad removal power, which causes vacancies in the commission’s membership. Quorum losses lead to agency inaction, prevent the executive branch from ensuring faithful execution of the laws, and threaten the constitutional rights of individuals who appear before adjudicatory commissions.

This Article presents an empirical study of quorum rules in multimember commissions. It traces how commissions lose their quorums, explores the consequences of quorum loss for administrative governance and individual rights, and analyzes the legal rules that govern when—and whether—a diminished commission may act.

This Article makes three contributions. Doctrinally, it explains the body of common law that governs the transaction of business in multimember institutions and shows that courts have inconsistently applied these principles in the administrative law context. Empirically, it draws on original data to illustrate variation in the quorum and voting requirements within seventy-six multimember commissions. Normatively, the Article raises questions about the ways in which quorum losses may impact the ability of the executive branch to fulfill its constitutional and statutory responsibilities. We urge the application of commonlaw quorum and voting defaults in the face of statutory silence to preserve the deliberate structures Congress designed. We also contend that presidential removals that destroy a quorum may be unconstitutional if they frustrate the executive’s duty to faithfully execute the laws, and we call for relaxation of exhaustion requirements when agency inaction deprives individuals of judicial review. The Article concludes with recommendations for how Congress should restructure statutory quorum requirements.

An Appendix to the Article is available here.

* Bednar is Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Phillips is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Georgia State University. The Authors thank Brian Feinstein, Kristin Hickman, Dan Walters, and commenters at the 2025 Theories of Administrative Law Workshop, the Stanford Law Review Volume 78 Symposium, and the University of Minnesota Law School for their helpful comments. The Authors also thank Ellen Bart for her incredible research assistance.