The current account of executive power is incomplete. Before joining the Supreme Court, Elena Kagan noted that the President seeks control over the executive branch. Kagan referred to this paradigm as “presidential administration.” Kagan’s work and the significant body of literature it spawned have also acknowledged, however, that independent agencies are generally outside the ambit of presidential power. Nonetheless, this scholarship has not looked beyond the White House to consider other forms of overarching executive influence on the administrative state.

This Article reveals that not only the President but also executive agencies seek and wield control over independent agencies for reasons that are distinct from the President’s interests. This results in what this Article calls “executive administration.” More specifically, executive agencies exert influence via litigation brought on their behalf by the Department of Justice against independent agencies before Article III courts. This contention is supported by an original dataset of approximately 120 cases spanning the mid-twentieth century through mid-2018.

Litigation has consistently furthered the interests of executive agencies, including their desire to limit independent agencies’ power to regulate them and in overlapping areas of policymaking authority. For instance, courts have reversed independent agency decisions binding executive agencies and have constrained independent agencies’ authority to implement their enabling statutes. This may be for the better, but may also be for the worse. On the one hand, litigation offers a meaningful vehicle for beneficial, ex post executive oversight of independent agencies, particularly in light of the dearth of presidential mechanisms of quality control. On the other hand, a recent Supreme Court decision suggests litigation may be used to walk back Chevron deference to independent agencies—to the detriment of their ability to enforce the law with nonpartisanship and expertise.