- Volume 77, Issue 2
- Page 369
Article
FTX’d: Conflicting Public and Private Interests in Chapter 11
Jonathan C. Lipson & David Skeel *
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is often justified by vague assertions that reorganizing troubled companies is in the “public interest.” There has, however, been surprisingly little effort to consider seriously what this public interest is, how it should be operationalized, or who should pay for it.
Based on a case study of the controversial bankruptcy of crypto complex FTX, this Article develops a three-part typology of public interests at stake in chapter 11 and shows how they can conflict with one another and with private interests: (1) the paramount public interest in the integrity of the judicial process; (2) bankruptcy-specific public interests in maximizing value through efficient, consolidated proceedings; and (3) “other” public interests, such as the prosecution and defense of serious crimes.
We place FTX’s counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell (S&C), at the center of this triptych. We present evidence indicating that S&C had undisclosed potential conflicts of interest due to apparent errors, omissions, and deceptions in their work for the company and its founder, Sam Bankman-Fried, before, at, and during the bankruptcy, thereby undermining the first-order public interest in procedural integrity. S&C’s role as debtor’s counsel has cast a troubling shadow over puzzling and costly decisions in the case, thereby undermining a second, bankruptcy-specific form of the public interest: maximizing an estate’s value. S&C often justified its actions by reference to the third, “other” facet of the public interest. Namely, S&C touted that it supported the prosecution of disfavored insiders such as Bankman-Fried. But that pricey task—for which S&C billed millions of dollars—may have distorted the prosecutions without producing observable economic benefit to the bankruptcy estate.
FTX is a cautionary tale about the power that lawyers have to frame, control, and profit from claims about the public interest in chapter 11. An examiner appointed late in the case largely exonerated S&C, although he engaged little of the evidence we present. This is not surprising because S&C’s resistance to that intervention left a narrow scope and little time for his investigation.
We situate our findings in a nascent body of literature exploring the public interest in bankruptcy. We suggest that the experience with S&C in FTX may reflect larger patterns in reorganization reminiscent of historical concerns about distorted incentives in restructuring processes. To ameliorate these concerns, we offer guidance to improve the functioning of the principal custodians of the public interest in chapter 11. Courts should more carefully police prebankruptcy connections of estate professionals and should use preliminary examinations more frequently. We further believe that the United States Trustee should have greater independence from other government actors so it can fulfill its watchdog mandate without compromise.
* Lipson is the Harold E. Kohn Professor of Law, Temple University-Beasley School of Law; Skeel is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. The authors thank Daniel Bussel, Brook Gotberg, Claire Hill, Michael Klausner, Michael Lewis, Bruce Markell, Nancy Rapoport, Robert Rasmussen, Mark Roe, William Simon, Robert Stark, Andrew Tuch, Harwell Wells, and participants at the Corporate Restructuring & Insolvency Seminar, Northwestern University School of Law Faculty Workshop, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Faculty Retreat, the 2024 Harvard-Wharton Insolvency & Restructuring Conference, and Brigham Young University’s 2024 “Deals” Conference for helpful comments and conversations, and thank Temple Law students Jasnoor Hundal and Meghan O’Brien, and Penn law students Zade Ghani and Anna Statz, for helpful research support. Most of the primary source material in this Article comes from pleadings or other documents used in the various cases discussed. It also reflects interviews with, among others, FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried and his parents, Stanford Law Professors Barbara Fried and Joseph Bankman. Although they provided factual information, and shared their perspective on events, they played no role in the writing or placement of this Article. We also sought to interview the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, but they declined to speak with us.