In the last six years, the courts of appeals have issued in the first instance a spate of procedurally unusual, politically charged preliminary injunctions. Like “universal” district court injunctions, these appellate injunctions—which this Note calls preliminary injunctions pending appeal (PIPAs) and appellate temporary restraining orders (appellate TROs)—are premised on shaky statutory authority. And like “universal” injunctions, PIPAs and appellate TROs accelerate and degrade judicial output. This Note describes their history, statutory basis, and practical effects.

The courts of appeals lack clear statutory authority to issue these orders. The All Writs Act—which the courts of appeals generally rely on to issue these injunctions—only allows courts to issue ancillary orders that protect their jurisdiction. Yet PIPAs and appellate TROs often conclusively resolve time-sensitive disputes, thereby destroying jurisdiction. Furthermore, the

All Writs Act precludes courts from issuing orders that enlarge their jurisdiction. But because the courts of appeals issue PIPAs and appellate TROs using the same standard as district courts—and typically without affording the district courts due deference—PIPAs and appellate TROs arguably expand the courts of appeals’ jurisdiction, in further violation of the All Writs Act.

Moreover, aside from lacking legal authorization, PIPAs and appellate TROs have created serious procedural and substantive problems for courts and litigants. These orders have yielded uncertainty about parties’ legal obligations by enabling litigants to quickly ricochet cases through the district courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court before any merits ruling. Furthermore, these orders have helped collapse preliminary relief into expedited merits relief by effectively abrogating the requirement that movants show a risk of concrete, irreparable harm. Finally, these orders risk exacerbating the perception that courts act politically, because these orders often lack reasoning, apply inconsistent legal standards, and encourage forum shopping.

PIPAs and appellate TROs are premised on flimsy legal authority, and they pose significant threats to the quality and legitimacy of the federal courts’ output—including for many of the reasons that the Supreme Court recently identified in Trump v. CASA. This Note therefore urges the Supreme Court to clarify that these appellate injunctions are unlawful. Without such guidance, PIPAs and appellate TROs will continue to unsettle the federal courts and fray the public’s trust in the judiciary.

* J.D., Stanford Law School, 2024. I thank Norman Spaulding for his guidance and encouragement and the Honorable Michael Pleters for his thoughtful comments. I am indebted to the editors of the Stanford Law Review, including Brian Xu, Kyle Melatti, Manon Theodoly, Rich Delzell, Jeff Elias, William Frankel, Lucia Jiang, Mirayda Martinez, Elise Miner, and Arjun Ravi for making publication of this Note possible. All errors are my own.